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Of all the areas of Psychology, intelligence is probably the most 
controversial.  At the same time, it is also one of the oldest areas of the 
discipline, dating back to the 1880's with the work of Francis Galton on 
individual differences in sensory functioning. It is impossible to capture 
in a single chapter the immense body of theorising and research that has 
been devoted to the topic of intelligence.  The aims of this chapter are 
considerably more modest: a) to give a brief historical overview of the 
area; b) to show how developments in the field are tied to the 
methodologies used to study intelligence; c) to describe current 
approaches to intelligence; and d) to introduce the reader to some of the 
main controversies in the area. This chapter will trace the developments 
of the construct, from Spearman's (1904) early conceptions of 
intelligence as mental energy to the much broader conceptions of 
modern day theorists. The chapter will also deal with the wider social 
context and the implications of our understanding of intelligence for 
society in general.  As will be seen, it is not an easy construct to 
understand but it cannot be ignored because, along with personality, it is 
one of the most fundamental aspects of the human psyche. 
 
Why Is Intelligence Such an Important Topic? 
What sets the area of mental abilities apart is the perceived 
importance of these abilities in our daily lives. We accept that we are 
physically stronger or weaker than other people, but few of us care 
much that someone is stronger or weaker than we are. It doesn't make a 
great deal of difference to our lives. In the cognitive domain, however, 
we are constantly compared with others, we compete with each other at 
a cognitive level for the best courses at universities, the best jobs, and 
for the best partners in life. Gottfredson (1997) stated "…no other 
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ability has been shown to have such generality or pervasiveness of 
effect as does intelligence" (p.6).   
The ancient Greeks were aware of the concept of intelligence, 
the Chinese before them, and every culture since.  Former Australian 
Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, used the term "clever country" to describe 
his vision of what kind of a nation he thought Australia should become.  
Newspapers, particularly the Sunday variety, often contain stories on 
some new wonder drug or some new training programme that can 
increase intelligence.  The popular media is also fascinated by displays 
of intelligence: children who can perform amazing computational feats, 
quiz show marvels who can recall facts with astonishing speed, musical 
and artistic prodigies, and so on. However, if we are to heed the advice 
of our former leader, and aspire to be clever, we must begin with some 
understanding of what the term means. As we shall see, it tends to mean 
different things to different people. 
 
Definitions of Intelligence 
A satisfactory definition of intelligence has always proved 
elusive. A symposium of 17 experts in the field convened by the editor 
of the Journal of Educational Psychology in 1921 to discuss the 
meaning of intelligence came up with almost as many interpretations as 
there were experts present. Intelligence was variously described as 
"ability to learn" (Buckingham), as "the power of good responses from 
the point of view of truth or fact" (Thorndike), as "the ability to carry on 
abstract thinking" (Terman), as "the ability of the individual to adapt 
himself adequately to relatively new situations in life" (Pintner), as 
"involving two factors - the capacity for knowledge and the knowledge 
possessed" (Henmon), as "the capacity to acquire capacity" (Woodrow).  
 Carroll (1993), to whom the author is indebted for the above 
information, reported that a similar symposium was convened in 1986 
by Sternberg and Detterman to update the findings of the 1921 
symposium. Twenty-five experts at the 1986 symposium came up with 
almost as many views of intelligence. Intelligence was described as "a 
quality of adapative behaviour" (Anastasi), as "the end product of 
development in the cognitive-psychological domain", as "a societal 
concept that operates in several domains - academic, technical, social, 
and practical" (Carroll), as "error-free transmission of information 
through the cortex" (Eysenck), as "acquired proficiency" (Glaser), as 
"mental self-government" (Sternberg).  Carroll (1993) reported  that 
"the symposium did not produce any definitive definition of 
intelligence, nor was it expected to" (p. 36). This second symposium 
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did, however, reflect some of the newer views of intelligence, such as 
metacognition (the ability to understand and control oneself), 
emphasising the fact that views of intelligence are changing over time. 
 In a recent review of human abilities, Sternberg and Kaufman 
(1988) threw the definitional problem wide open by reminding us that 
non-Western views of intelligence may differ quite markedly from those 
expressed above. The Western emphasis on speed (see later sections of 
this chapter), for example, is not shared by many cultures. Questions of 
definition become more difficult if one moves beyond the human sphere 
to consider whether or not intelligence is something that is shared with 
other species. The Greek philosopher Anaxagoras believed that all 
animals have intelligence, but humans were superior.  Aristotle arranged 
the animal species in a hierarchy with man at the top.  During the 
middle ages, Christian theology dominated thinking about such issues 
and the doctrine of special creation replaced the view of continuity in 
nature.  The doctrine separated animals and humans by the presence of a 
soul in humans and by the human's capability for reason.  The 
emergence of Darwin's theory of evolution in the late 19th Century 
brought humans and animals together again on the same continuum.  
Darwin stated that the difference between the mind of a human and that 
of the highest animal was one of degree and not of kind.  Two books 
bearing the title "Animal Intelligence" were published in the 19th 
Century. 
Contemporary views of intelligence in animals are more 
flexible.  Herman and Pack (1994) reported on a number of research 
programmes studying the behaviour of pigeons, chimpanzees, rats, and 
dolphins.  These programmes have demonstrated that dolphins can 
remember lists of sounds and show the same primary and recency 
effects as humans; pigeons can reliably place classes of objects in 
different perceptual categories; vervet monkeys use different 
vocalisations to refer to four different types of predators; dolphins can 
learn to understand sequences of human commands where 
understanding depends on the meaning of words and word order; a 
variety of different species can learn various counting tasks; wild 
chimpanzees appear to actually tutor their young in the art of 
nutcracking; different animal species can show "deceitful" behaviour; 
e.g., feigning injury to lure predators away from young.   
The list goes on. How these various displays of apparently 
intelligent behaviour relate to the concept of intelligence is still 
problematical.  To keep matters as uncomplicated as possible, this 
chapter will leave the definition of intelligence open and deal only with 
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research relating to human intelligence. The origins of that research date 
back to the end of the 1800's. 
 
Theories of intelligence 
 There are too many theories of intelligence to cover in a single 
chapter but some have been much more influential than others. These 
will be summarised in the following section. 
 
Spearman's one-factor theory 
The figure normally associated with the origins of the concept of 
intelligence is Francis Galton who, in the late 1800's, was using tests of 
sensory discrimination to measure intellectual ability, often judged at 
that time by teachers' ratings.  The idea of using such simple tests would 
strike many people today as being naive but Galton was anything but 
naïve. Howard (1991) reports that at the age of four he wrote this letter 
to his sister: 
My Dear Adele, 
I am four years old and can read any English book. I can say all the 
Latin substantives and adjectives and active verbs besides 52 lines 
of Latin poetry. I can cast up any sum in addition and can multiply 
by 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11. I can also say the pence table. I read 
French a little and I know the clock. 
Quite clearly, Galton did not suffer from a lack of intelligence 
himself! The logic of using sensory measures was sound enough.  All 
information comes to use via the senses and the quality of our mental 
processes will depend to some extent on the quality of the sensory input.  
It followed, therefore, that those with better sensory discrimination 
processes could well have better quality mental processes as well. Logic 
notwithstanding, Galton's simple tests did not discriminate between so-
called "intelligent" and "non-intelligent" people.  Nevertheless, his 
views were influential and most of his contemporaries followed his lead 
in exploring intelligence through basic sensory functions.  Charles 
Spearman, one of the leading figures in the history of intelligence, 
began his illustrious career using these same sensory discrimination 
tests.  
The first real breakthrough in the field of intelligence stemmed 
from a practical problem in the French education system.  Following the 
introduction of universal education in this country, there was a need to 
identify students who had learning difficulties.  Alfred Binet was given 
the task of developing psychological and physical diagnostic procedures 
for determining retardation and he took the unusual step of developing a 
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thirty-problem test that measured several abilities related to intellect, 
such as judgement and reasoning. The break from measures of sensory 
ability was important because, unlike the earlier sensory tests, scores on 
Binet's test did correspond with other ratings of intelligence.  The 
popularity of Binet's  tests - they were soon used in other countries as 
well - proved to be a much-needed stimulus for research on the nature 
of intelligence itself.  In one of those accidents of history, about the time 
that Binet published his test (1904), one of the major figures in the field 
of intelligence, Charles Spearman, began publishing articles on his 
theory of intelligence.  As Brody (1992) put it, "Spearman provided a 
theory and Binet provided a test" (p. 8).  
Spearman was an English engineer and army officer who 
became interested in psychology late in life.  He proposed a theory of 
intelligence that became known as the two-factor theory (Spearman 
1904, 1927).  In keeping with his engineering background, Spearman 
saw intelligence as comprising a central pool of energy that was 
required for all cognitive tasks. This was the first of his factors, a 
general factor that he labelled 'g'.  In addition to the general factor, each 
task has something unique to itself, a specific factor.  Spearman likened 
the second of his factors to engines, with an engine for every task.  
Thus, when a person attempts a mathematical problem, it is 'g' that 
provides the energy for the operation and a specific mathematical 
engine that is responsible for the execution of the task.  People differ in 
the amount they have of each and it is these differences that explain the 
variation we observe between individuals on cognitive tasks. 
Spearman's two-factor theory of intelligence has been extremely 
influential because he developed techniques for measuring the extent to 
which a test measured 'g' - its "loading" or "saturation". Some tests 
measured it very well, others hardly at all. Spearman knew, for 
example, that 'g' could not be measured very well by tests of sensory 
discrimination, as Galton had tried to do.  It could be measured by tests 
of comprehension, memory, and reasoning.  Spearman recognised that 
the best predictors of academic ability were tests that required the 
"eduction of relations and correlates" which he defined as follows: 
The eduction of relations … when a person has in mind any 
two or more ideas … he has more or less power to bring to 
mind any relations that sensibly hold between them. 
It is instanced whenever a person becomes aware, say that 
beer tastes something like weak quinine … or that the 
proposition " all A is B' proves the proposition "Some A is 
B". 
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The eduction of correlates … when a person has in mind 
any idea together with a relation, he has more or less power 
to bring up into mind the correlative idea. 
For example, let anyone hear a musical note and try to 
imagine the note a fifth higher …(Spearman, 1927, pp. 
165-166, cited in Brody, 1992). 
 
The problem was that Spearman was describing processes that 
could not be observed directly.  What he could observe directly were the 
scores that people were obtaining on tests that he was developing to 
measure 'g'.  He could also observe, as others had done before him, 
whether there was any correspondence between scores on tests of 'g' and 
academic achievement. One of Spearman's major criticisms of earlier 
work on intelligence was that it did not use quantitative indices of the 
degree of relationship between different measures.  Spearman was the 
first to actually use correlations as the raw data upon which a theory of 
intelligence is based. For those who may be unfamiliar with the concept 
of correlation, a brief description follows. 
A correlation coefficient can take values from 1.00 to -100.  A 
correlation of 1.00 between any two tests means that they are perfectly 
related.  If you knew how well a person performed on one test, you 
would know how well they performed on the other.  For example, if a 
child topped the class on the first test, a correlation of 1.00 necessarily 
implies that the child tops the class on the other test.  A correlation of -
1.00 also indicates a perfect relationship but this time in an inverse 
manner.  Thus, if a child came top of the class on one test that same 
child would necessarily be at the bottom of the class on the other test.  
The actual index of correlation is usually somewhere between these 
perfect extremes.  The closer the index is to 1.00 or -1.00, the stronger 
the relationship between the variables.  The closer to zero, the weaker 
the relationship, until at 0.0 there is no relationship at all between the 
variables.   
For Spearman, the correlations among the tests he used were the 
data his theories had to explain. One thing struck Spearman quite 
forcibly: there were no inverse correlations among his cognitive 
measures.  He used the term "positive manifold" to describe the 
tendency for all cognitive tasks to be positively correlated. To observe 
that two tests are positively correlated is one thing, to explain it is 
another. One explanation for the observation of a correlation is that 
performance on the two tests is driven by the same underlying ability.  
In fact, this is one of the foundations of theory building in the field of 
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individual differences, of which intelligence forms a part.  Spearman's 
observation that all cognitive tests are positively correlated led him to 
claim that despite obvious differences in the content of the tests (e.g., 
some measuring word knowledge, others spatial ability), they all rely to 
some extent upon 'g'.  Thus, to a very large extent, Spearman's two-
factor theory was driven by his attempt to explain the phenomenon of 
positive manifold.  He did so by stressing the importance of a dominant 
single factor.  As I mentioned earlier, the specific factors were added to 
the theory to account for differences due to unique operations called for 
by each test.  
It is important to recognise the empirical basis for Spearman's 
theory. There is no doubting the fact that cognitive tests do tend to be 
positively correlated.  Where subsequent theorists have differed from 
Spearman is in their accounts of what it is that all tests have in common 
and how much emphasis should be placed on the general factor. 
Spearman's description of 'g' as mental energy was disputed by one of 
his contemporaries, Godfrey Thompson, who argued that there was a 
large set of independent bonds or units in the mind. Any test of ability 
samples some of these bonds. The correlations that Spearman explained 
in terms of sharing a central energy source were explained by 
Thompson as tasks sharing the same bonds. Thus, if two tests sample a 
large number of bonds, by the laws of chance some of these will be the 
same and it is the sharing that accounts for the observed correlations. 
Thompson explained the obvious individual differences in intelligence 
by claiming that each individual possessed only a subset of the universe 
of bonds and that individuals differed in the number of bonds or units of 
intelligence they possessed (Brody, 1992). 
Other accounts of the tendency for all cognitive tasks to be 
positively correlated have arisen over the years. For the most part, they 
have followed Spearman's lead in looking for a single entity that is 
shared by all cognitive tasks. Hunt (1980), for example, likened the 
concept of attention to that of 'g'. As Hunt knew, however, the 
comparison did not help to clarify the nature of intelligence because 
attention is just as elusive a concept as intelligence. An alternative 
interpretation of 'g' is that it reflects the ability of the individual to 
organise processing strategies to face new kinds of mental problems. 
This account of intelligence is reflected in the work of information 
processing theorists who stress the importance of metacognition as a 
component of intelligence (e.g., Sternberg, 1979). What follows from 
metacognition are planfulness, self-monitoring, and inventiveness, each 
of which can be thought of as hallmarks of intelligent behaviour. 
Intelligence: Theories And Issues   8 
In a similar vein, it has been suggested that the primary 
difference between persons of normal intelligence and the mentally 
retarded lies in the degree to which people are able to develop and use 
information processing strategies (Belmont, Buttefield, & Ferretti, 
1982). They postulated a process called "Executive Functioning" which 
monitors and controls these strategies. Detterman (1982) pointed out 
that Executive Functioning is analogous to the general intelligence 
factor since its effects should be evident in every sort of mental test or 
cognitive task.  
More recent research on intelligence has also been used to 
support Spearman's notion of a central factor of intelligence. Brody 
(1992) reported on research that relates individual differences in 
intelligence to measures of the overall metabolism of the brain. 
Interestingly, these studies still rely on correlational data. The research 
shows a high negative correlation between a measure of energy 
expenditure of the brain and scores on a test of abstract reasoning 
ability. In other words, more intelligent people do not expend as much 
energy on the task. "These findings may be viewed as providing support 
for a contemporary version of Spearman's theory of mental energy" 
(Brody, 1992, p. 12). A number of modern researchers have gone one 
step further than this and are searching for the basic processes that 
constitute 'g'. 
The debate between Spearman and Thompson is characteristic of 
other debates that have occurred in the history of this branch of the 
discipline of psychology. The problem with correlational data is that 
different interpretations are always possible and both Spearman's and 
Thompson's theories were able to account for the data generated by 
early studies of intelligence. Before long, however, it became evident 
that Spearman's theory of a single factor of intelligence that accounted 
for all observed correlations among tests could not be correct. The need 
for mass testing of recruits during the First World War had given the 
testing movement a lot of impetus and many new tests had been 
developed. It soon became increasingly obvious that groups of tests 
tended to have more in common with each other than their 'g' loadings 
suggested they would. A set of spatial tests, for example, which might 
not be very good measures of 'g', tended to be highly correlated with 
each other. The same could be said for groups of verbal tests, numerical 
tests, and so on. As the data accumulated, it became clear that 
Spearman's two-factor theory of intelligence could not account for the 
data. The only possible explanation was that tests could be correlated 
for reasons other than their dependence on 'g'.  
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Thurstone's theory of primary mental abilities 
 Spearman was aware of the evidence accumulating against his 
two-factor theory but he continued to emphasise the importance of the 
general factor. The real challenge to his theory came in the person of 
U.S. psychologist, Thurstone, who used his own versions of the new 
technique of factor analysis to demonstrate that there was not one 
underlying ability but a number of independent abilities. In order to 
understand the basis for his challenge, a brief introduction to factor 
analysis is necessary.  
Mention was made earlier of the fact that correlations are the 
data upon which early theories of intelligence were based. When there 
are many tests in a study, however, there are also very many 
correlations. A study that includes 10 intelligence tests will generate 45 
inter-test correlations. Many studies of intelligence contain far more 
than 10 tests. To overcome the problem of trying to analyse so many 
correlations simulaneously, Thurstone developed a technique known as 
multiple factor analysis (MFA). MFA is a mathematical tool that detects 
patterns of correlations among the tests in the study. Most textbooks 
describe factor analysis as a technique that is mainly used to reduce a 
large set of variables to a smaller underlying set of dimensions. One of 
the requirements of a successful factor analysis is that the underlying 
dimensions explain most of the intercorrelations among the input 
variables.  The details of how it does this need not concern us here but it 
is important to have some understanding of how factor analysis works. 
Consider the following example. 
Here are some data that I collected many years ago on three 
measures of reasoning ability (R1 to R3 in Table 1), three measures of 
verbal ability (V1 to V3), and three measures of spatial ability (S1 to 
S3). The means, standard deviations, and correlations are presented in 
Table 8.1. 
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Table 8. 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Among Cognitive Variables (N = 
126) 
 
Tests M SD R1 R2 R3 V1 V2 V3 S1 S2 
R1   3.01 1.00        
R2 9.02 3.76 .73 1.00       
R3 11.34 3.68 .58 .51 1.00      
V1 5.33 1.68 .35 .31 .27 1.00     
V2 10.22 4.18 .36 .39 .34 .56 1.00    
V3 10.51 4.08 .28 .22 .39 .51 .54 1.00   
S1 6.63 2.89 .30 .24 .12 .10 .32 .21 1.00  
S2 11.37 3.68 .26 .32 .16 .22 .30 .19 .50 1.00 
S3 14.19 3.75 .36 .37 .20 .16 .39 .27 .54 .62 
 
 To those not familiar with statistics, Table 1 contains the names 
of the nine tests in the first row and in the first column. The means and 
standard deviations of the tests are shown in columns two and three. 
The remainder of the matrix is a correlation matrix, showing the type of 
data that formed the basis for much of the research on the nature of 
intelligence. Boxes have been drawn around the correlations among 
each of the three subsets of tests so that they will stand out more clearly. 
If you examine the correlations among all of the tests, one 
feature is immediately apparent: they are all positively correlated. These 
positive correlations illustrate the phenomenon that Spearman labelled 
positive manifold. However, if you look closely within each box you 
can see that the reasoning tests are more highly correlated among 
themselves than they are with the other tests in the battery. The same is 
true of the verbal and spatial tests, suggesting that there must be factors 
other than 'g' that cause tests to be correlated. In the present instance, it 
looks very much as though the data are suggesting that all the tests have 
something in common because they are all correlated. In addition, the 
data suggest that reasoning tests have something else in common 
amongst themselves that helps to explain their higher intercorrelations. 
The same is true for the verbal and spatial tests.  
It was data sets like this that prompted Thurstone to develop his 
model of separate mental abilities. Using his own version of MFA, 
Thurstone analysed correlations obtained from large batteries of tests 
and concluded that there was not a single factor of intelligence but a set 
of primary mental abilities. With the dataset shown in Table 8.1 
(Fogarty, 1984), it is possible to illustrate how he reached this 
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conclusion. Using a modern factor analysis program on a laptop 
computer, the output shown in Table 8.2 was obtained. 
Factor analysis is essentially a data reduction technique: it is 
designed to find an underlying set of factors that can explain 
performance on a set of observed variables. In this case, the observed 
variables are the nine tests administered to 126 people. If Spearman was 
correct, only one underlying factor ('g') would be needed to explain the 
correlations among the nine tests. If Thurstone was correct, a number of 
factors would be needed to explain the correlations. We can see from 
Table 8.2, that the output from factor analysis suggests that three factors 








Tests 1 2 3 
R1 .878 .210 .177 
R2 .736 .258 .179 
R3 .586 .006 .301 
V1 .233 .001 .685 
V2 .211 .295 .699 
V3 .145 .146 .688 
S1 .140 .637 .111 
S2 .112 .715 .140 
S3 .185 .802 .154 
  
 The tests themselves are listed in the first column. The numbers 
in the next three columns indicate the extent to which a particular test 
depends on each of the three factors. Thus, the first reasoning test (R1), 
depends very much on Factor 1 because it has a high loading of .878 on 
this factor. It has low loadings on Factors 2 and 3, so does not depend 
very much on these two factors. We need to look at what other tests are 
loading on this factor to suggest what it might represent. Tests R2 and 
R3 are the only other ones that have high loadings on Factor 1, so we 
can call it a reasoning factor. Test R1 was actually a Number Series test, 
R2 a Letter Series test, and R3 a test called Sets. All three are known to 
measure reasoning ability, so it is not surprising to us that they group 
together in a factor analysis.  
  The last three variables (S1, S2, and S3) were all different kinds 
of spatial test. We can see that performance on these three tests depends 
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very much on individual differences on Factor 2, and very little on the 
other two factors. We can feel quite safe declaring that Factor 2 
represents spatial ability. Test V1 was a Spelling test, V2 a Scrambled 
Words test, and V3 a Hidden Words test. All three have high loadings 
on Factor 3 and low loadings on Factors 1 and 2, so we can say that 
performance on all three of these tests is driven by the same underlying 
factor. Because it is quite obvious what the three tests have in common, 
we can also suggest that Factor 3 represents verbal ability. 
 Set out in this way, the results of a factor analysis might appear 
trivial and uninformative. Select three tests of reasoning ability, three 
tests of verbal ability, and three tests of spatial ability and then subject 
the resulting intercorrelation matrix to factor analysis and one should 
hardly be surprised that the analysis indentifies three underlying factors 
corresponding to the ones used to select the tests in the first place. True 
enough, but turn the clock back to the late 1920's and early 1930's when 
terms such as "verbal ability" had no empirical basis and it is possible to 
see what a powerful tool factor analysis was to researchers in this field. 
By constructing tests that used different content and different processes, 
forming correlation matrices among the tests, and then subjecting the 
matrices to factor analyses, theorists were able to gain an impression of 
how many underlying factors were needed to account for variations in 
performance on cognitive tasks. 
 Thurstone placed great reliance on the techniques of MFA to 
refine his model of intelligence. From the data collected in studies 
involving a large number and variety of cognitive tests (56 in his first 
study), Thurstone concluded that intelligence was made up of seven 
independent primary mental abilities which were labelled S (Space), P 
(Perceptual Speed), N (Number Facility), V (Verbal Relations), W 
(Word Fluency), M (Memory), and I (Induction - i.e., reasoning). The 
number of abilities is not actually crucial to Thurstone's theory. It really 
does not matter if the true number is more or less than seven, what was 
important in Thurstone's early formulation of his Primary Mental 
Abilities (PMA) theory is that the abilities were described as 
independent, implying that you could be strong in one ability area and 
very weak in another. Not surprisingly, Spearman hotly disputed this 
point of view. Spearman had certainly realised that it was possible to 
identify factors other than 'g' but it was a long step from this position to 
one in which 'g' was ignored completely and abilities were said to be 
numerous and independent. 
 As has been the case so often in this field of psychology, the 
reason for the differences between these two contrasting views of 
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intelligence had its roots in the methodology employed. Spearman used 
a technique of factor analysis that highlighted the importance of what 
was common to all tests, whereas Thurstone used a technique that 
maximised the chances of tests arranging themselves into independent 
groups. The three factors shown in Table 8.2 were obtained by a 
technique known in factor analysis as "orthogonal rotation". The 
mechanics of this technique need not concern us here but we can note 
that the factors that come out of such an analysis are bound to be 
uncorrelated. A different technique of rotation allows factors to be 
correlated. This technique is recommended by many researchers 
because it does not impose constraints on the factors: they can be 
uncorrelated or correlated. 
 In order to see the effect that different techniques of factor 
analysis can have, the data shown in Table 8.1 were reanalysed, this 
time allowing the factors to be correlated. The resulting factor analytic 
solution was much the same as that shown in Table 8.1. If anything, this 
second solution was even easier to interpret than the first. The important 
difference between the two solutions is that the second solution 
produced a factor intercorrelation matrix showing that the correlation 
between Factor 1 and Factor 2 was .395, between Factor 1 and Factor 3 
the correlation was .512, and between Factors 2 and 3, the correlation 
was .354. This was the important fact that Thurstone had overlooked in 
this early work: it is possible to factor analyse a correlation matrix so 
that tests form groups that measure primary mental abilities, rather than 
a single general factor of intelligence, but these primary mental abilities 
are themselves correlated. The proponents of the single factor theory of 
intelligence were quick to claim that the cause of the correlation among 
these abilities was 'g'. The arrangement implied by this suggestion is 
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Figure 8.1. Depiction of relationships between tests, primary factors, 
and a general factor 
 
 Figure 8.1 shows that performance on tests used by Fogarty 
(1984) is driven by individual differences on the underlying reasoning, 
verbal, and spatial abilities. Performance on these abilities is in turn 
driven by individual differences in 'g'. Quite obviously, models of this 
type can be extended to include a larger number of tests and primary 
abilities. Such models represent a compromise between the positions of 
Spearman and Thurstone. They indicate that it is possible to have both 
primary mental abilities and a general factor of intelligence. The 
exercise that we have just completed with a subset of the author's own 
data was a re-enactment of analyses that were being conducted by a 
number of psychologists in the late 1930's and early 1940's. Eysenck 
(1939) re-analysed Thurstone's data using factor analytic techniques that 
did allow the 'g' factor to emerge. He found strong evidence for both a 
'g' factor and for the same primary mental abilities that Thurstone had 
found. Cattell (1941) indicated that Spearman's theory and Thurstone's 
theory might be reconciled by postulating the existence of a hierarchical 
structure of ability. A number of very influential hierarchical models 
emerged in the 1940s, 50s, and 60s. 
 
Hierarchical Models of Intelligence 
 The first well-acknowledged hierarchical model of intelligence 
was proposed by Phillip E. Vernon, a colleague of Spearman's. Vernon 
(1950) described a structure which placed 'g' at the top of an inverted 
tree-like figure. Immediately below 'g' were two other broad abilities, 
v:ed (verbal-educational) and k:m (spatial-mechanical-practical). 
Branching out from each of these were narrower group factors. For 
example, verbal ability was viewed as a narrow group factor located 
under the v:ed broad group factor and spatial ability was a narrow group 
factor under the k:m group. More specific abilities were located at a 
lower level still. Although, his model allowed various kinds of group 
factors, some broader than others, Vernon still felt that 'g' was the major 
determinant of individual differences in performance on cognitive tasks.  
 At about the same time that Vernon was developing his 
hierarchical theory of intelligence, another major figure emerged who 
was to initiate the work that led to what is now widely regarded as the 
dominant model of intelligence in the world today. Raymond Cattell 
was a student of Spearman's who moved to the U.S. and commenced 
work on both factor analysis and theories of intelligence. Like Vernon, 
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Cattell believed that there was more than one higher-order factor. His 
view was that there were two kinds of intelligences: "fluid" (General 
Fluid: Gf) and "crystallised" (General Crystallised: Gc). Fluid 
intelligence was measured by tests that were assumed to measure the 
biological capacity of the individual to acquire knowledge. Reasoning 
processes were an important part of this ability. Crystallised 
intelligence, was defined by tests that were assumed to measure the 
influence of schooling and acculturation. Tests of general knowledge 
and vocabulary measure Gc. Thus, in a sense, crystallised intelligence 
represents the store of an individual's knowledge and skills whereas Gf 
represents the processes that helped the individual to acquire these 
knowledge and skills. The model proposed by Cattell bore some 
similarities to the model put forward by Donald Hebb (1949), who 
suggested that there are three kinds of intelligence: Intelligence A, that 
which we are born with, representing our innate potential; Intelligence 
B, representing the functioning of the brain as a result of the 
development that has occurred; and Intelligence C, representing 
measured intelligence. The first two of these are similar to Cattell's 
Fluid and Crystallised intelligences. 
 It was not until 1963 that Cattell gave a more complete account 
of his theory. In doing so, he was careful to look for more than just 
statistical evidence that the structure he proposed was valid. Gf was said 
to have a more biological basis than Gc. Indeed, it is defined by one 
author as "one's native, biologically endowed ability" (Howard, 1991, 
p.38). Thus, in the early stages of life, Gf helps to shape Gc. Later in 
life, as the brain began to deteriorate, Gf  shows a decline. That is, it 
becomes harder for people to engage in the abstract reasoning processes 
that form the basis of some kinds of knowledge. Gc, on the other hand, 
is less affected by physical deterioration of the brain and certain types of 
knowledge can continue to develop virtually throughout one's lifespan.  
 Cattell was not the first to propose a distinction between two 
broad abilities of this type but his theory generated predictions, such as 
age-related decline in Gf, that were supported by empirical findings. His 
theory also attracted capable adherents, such as his student John Horn, 
who were able to take the model to new levels of development. Horn 
(1985) maintained the distinction between Gf and Gc but reinterpreted 
their meaning somewhat, especially Gf. Horn did not believe that Gf 
was a biological ability factor and he did not believe that there was a 
causal pathway leading from Gf to Gc, even early in life. Instead, both 
Gf and Gc are characterised by processes of reasoning, concept 
formation, and problem solving. The main difference is that Gf depends 
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relatively little on the effects of formal education and cultural 
experiences (Stankov, Boyle, & Cattell, 1995).  
The complexity of the Gf/Gc model has increased considerably 
since the first description by Cattell (1963). Figure 8.2 shows how the 
model looked to Horn (1985). 
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Figure 8.2.  Representation of Horn's theory of intelligence (adapted 
from Horn, 1985) 
 
Not model is not exactly as depicted by Horn, it has been 
simplified somewhat to suit our purposes, but captures the main features 
of Gf/Gc theory. A quick glance over this model shows how it seeks to 
explain much of what is already known about intelligence. To begin 
with, it is a hierarchical model. Notice, however, that there is no 'g' at 
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the top of the hierarchy. Horn has a particular aversion to the notion of a 
general factor of intelligence, especially because of the way in which 
the concept of 'g' has been used to promote racist views. We will return 
to this controversy later in the chapter. As Carroll (1993) points out, 
however, if 'g' is ignored or denied, the theory does not really have an 
explanation for the correlation (about .50) that exists between Gf and 
Gc. Brody (1992) raised this same criticism.  
The centre of Figure 8.2 contains circles enclosing the main 
second-order factors. Notice that there are 9 broad second-order factors 
in this model and that they are not shown in an inverted tree-like 
structure but rather in something that bears more resemblance to a chart. 
The left hand side of the chart shows a vertical line depicting the 
sequence of development from infancy to adulthood whilst the right 
hand side shows another vertical line representing the complexity of the 
processes at each level. Gf and Gc appear at the top of the hieararchy 
and they are characterised by what Horn calls "deep processing" 
operations. Spearman's eduction of relations and correlates exemplify 
the types of cognitive processes one would find at this level. At the next 
level down, we find the various perceptual organizational processes: 
visual abilities, auditory abilities, and processes related to speed of 
information processing. The placement of these second-order factors 
below Gf and Gc implies that they are less complex and that in a 
developmental sense, we master these abilities before we master the Gf 
and Gc abilities. Short term and long term memory functions are found 
about midway down the chart. The description of these functions as 
"Association processing" refers to the type of mental operation that is 
predominant at this stage of development, forming associations among 
facts, ideas, and so forth. At the very bottom level, are the sensory 
functions, the very sort of thing that Galton was assessing 100 years 
earlier in a vain attempt to measure intelligence. The model shows why 
these attempts were unsuccessful: the complex functions that we now 
know to be more central to intelligence are at the top of the hierarchy, 
whilst the sensory functions are at the bottom. Horn assumed that there 
would be little correlation among measures taken at the bottom of the 
hierarchy and substantial correlations among measures taken at the top. 
Galton did indeed find that sensory discrimination measures failed to 
correlate with teachers' ratings of intelligence. Binet, who sampled tasks 
from the top of the chart, found impressive correlations between his 
measures and measures of intelligence. The chart, however, also 
partially supports the logic of Galton's quest. Galton looked at sensory 
measures because he thought that good quality sensory input would lead 
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to good quality mental processes. Horn's chart suggests that good 
quality input is a necessary but not sufficient condition for good quality 
mental processes. The input has to be processed and organized as it 
makes its way up the information processing hierarchy. Detection is just 
the first of the steps and there is no guarantee that someone who is good 
at this level will also be good at the other levels. 
There are problems with Horn's model but it does accommodate 
many of the empirical findings noted in the literature. It also has the 
desirable characteristic of being an open model, one that invites further 
developments. The inclusion of perceptual organisation factors, for 
example, led to the recognition of the auditory organisation factor that 
appears in Figure 8.2 (Stankov & Horn, 1980). Stankov, a student of 
John Horn's who has worked for many years now at the University of 
Sydney, reasoned that if there can be spatial abilities, then there should 
also be auditory abilities. Obvious examples occur in the field of music 
but Stankov discovered a range of other tasks, some of them involving 
distortions of speech, that depend on this factor. Work of this kind has 
great importance in areas where auditory abilities are a matter of life 
and death (e.g., aircraft cockpits). Stankov and his colleages are now 
actively exploring the bases of individual differences in other sensory 
domains, notably touch. Indeed, the model has already been extended 
through the inclusion of a tactile-kinesthetic ability that has much in 
common with broad visualisation and fluid intelligence (Roberts, 
Stankov, Pallier, & Dolph, 1997). Roberts and his co-workers used tasks 
that required participants to identify objects by shape and texture, to 
perform a bead memory test blindfolded, to detect letters and figures 
traced on their fingers, and a variety of other tactile tasks. Their findings 
suggest other ways in which intelligence can be assessed, perhaps less 
culturally biased methods. Research has been active on other aspects of 
the Gf/Gc model as well. Attempts have been made to determine the 
status of other supposed factors such as attention (Stankov, 1983), the 
ability to divide one's attention (Fogarty & Stankov, 1982; Fogarty, 
1987), the status of mental imagery ability (Burton, 1998), factors 
relating to cognitive style (Fogarty & Burton, 1996), and some very 
interesting recent work on cognitive speed factors (Roberts & Stankov, 
1998). The results of this work will extend the model further. Carroll 
(1993) in his extraordinary review of factor analytic studies of human 
cognitive abilities had this to say about the Gf/Gc model: 
 The Cattell-Horn model, as summarised by Horn (1985, 1988), 
is a true hierarchical model covering all major domains of intellectual 
functioning. Numerous details remain to be filled in through further 
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research, but among available models it appears to offer the most well-
founded and reasonable approach to an acceptable theory of the 
structure of cognitive abilities. (p. 62). 
 
Other models of intelligence 
 There are other models of intelligence that are also based on 
factor analysis or modifications of factor analysis. One of the most 
interesting of these is Guttman's radex theory (Guttman, 1954) in which 
he ordered ability tests in two ways, according to their complexity and 
according to their content. The first of these orderings is called a 
simplex, in which a proper ranking is possible. The second is called a 
circumplex, where proper ranking is not possible but where contents 
may still be displayed by ordering them in a circular way. It is possible 
to combine these two orderings in what Guttman called a radex where 
more complex tests are located towards the centre of a series of 
concentric circles representing increasing complexity, and where the 
various content areas are shown as sectors. A rather crude 
representation of a radex is shown in Figure 8.3. The concentric circles 
do not mark any clear borders but are shown to reinforce the impression 
of increasing complexity as one moves to the centre. Similarly, the four 
content areas shown are not meant to represent the sum total of all 
contents possible. Rather, they show four different types of content and 
illustrate the notion that tests employing a particular type of content will 
be found in the same sector. Four hypothetical tests, represented as 
black dots, are shown in the diagram. One test is located towards the 
centre of the radex. We know from its location at the centre that such a 
test would be a good measure of 'g'. Because it is in the figural sector, 
we can see that this imaginary test employs figural or pictorial items. 
There is another dot in the figural sector but in the outer circle. We can 











Figure 8.3. Represention of a Radex Model of Intelligence 
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 Snow, Kyllonen, and Marshalek (1984) demonstrated that 
Guttman's model is compatible with the hierarchical model of 
intelligence derived from factor analysis. They were able to locate a 
large number of well-known measures of intelligence on a two-
dimensional configuration, similar to that shown in Figure 8.3. These 
researchers believed that the radex models proposed by Guttman 
provide a generally more useful perspective on cognitive abilities and 
their relations than does factor analysis. They concluded that "The radex 
thus emerges as the most general theoretical model to date on both 
substantive and methodological grounds" (Snow et al., 1984, p.88). 
 
Summary of the theories of intelligence based on factor analysis 
 Up to this point, the chapter has focussed primarily on the 
contributions of early workers in the field of intelligence. There are a 
number of reasons for this. The first is that this early work is still very 
relevant to our modern understanding of the concept of intelligence. 
Furthermore, it tends to concentrate on a narrow range of themes, it 
shows a reasonably clear development of the concept, and is thus easier 
to explain in a limited space. Another reason is that the practice of 
intelligence testing today is still very largely shaped by the work of 
these earlier researchers. Some of the most popular tests in use today are 
modelled on the theories developed by Binet, Spearman, Thurstone, 
Vernon, and Cattell. As we shall see in the concluding sections of this 
chapter, researchers have broken away from the relatively narrow 
approaches of the past. Some are now calling for the recognition of 
different intelligences, the sort that cannot be captured by standard 
psychometric tests. Developmental psychologists, such as Piaget, have 
long argued that we should spend more time looking at the processes by 
which all children come to think intelligently, rather than focussing on 
why they differ among themselves. There is also new interest in the 
neural and biological bases of intelligence, prompted by developments 
in medical technology that allow us better insight into neural processes. 
Researchers have argued that to base the concept of intelligence solely 
on the interpretation of patterns of correlation obtained from batteries of 
cognitive tests leads to a neglect of many important aspects of mental 
ability. Some of the alternative approaches are described in the next 
section. 
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Gardner's multiple intelligences 
 Gardner (1983) put forward some interesting ideas about the 
nature of intelligence in his book Frames of Mind. Gardner argued that 
our views of intelligence should be informed not only by work with 
"normal" children but also by studies of gifted children, of experts in 
various domains, of valued abilities in different cultures, and by 
individuals who have suffered types of brain damage. Gardner rejected 
the idea that there is a general ability that acts as a kind of 
"superability". Instead, there are several relatively independent 
intelligences which he defined as a set of problem solving skills in a 
given domain. In order for something to be considered an "intelligence", 
Gardner listed a set of eight criteria that had to be met. These are as 
follows: 
1. Potential isolation by brain damage. In other words, if it can be 
demonstrated that a particular ability is affected by localised brain 
damage and other abilities are not affected, then this criterion is 
satisfied. 
2. The existence of idiot savants, prodigies, and other exceptional 
individuals. Idiot savants are otherwise handicapped individuals 
who exhibit a high level of development in a particular ability. 
Gardner argued that if people can be exceptional in one area but 
only average or below average in others, then it constitutes evidence 
that the ability in question may be a separate intelligence. 
3. An identifiable core operation or set of operations. For example, the 
ability to discriminate between tones is characteristic of musical 
ability. 
4. A distinctive developmental history, leading to a stage of expertise. 
5. An evolutionary history and evolutionary plausibility. Gardner felt 
that intelligences have evolved and that we should be able to trace 
their evolutionary history, or see evidence of it in other species. For 
example, rudimentary forms of linguistic intelligence can be seen in 
other species and the evolutionary value is clear.  
6. Support from experimental psychological tasks. For example, if it is 
claimed that two intelligences are separate, then it should be 
possible to demonstrate in a laboratory setting that tasks drawn from 
each of the intelligences do not interfere with each other (c.f. 
Fogarty, 1987). 
7. Support from psychometric findings. In other words, there should 
not be large correlations between tasks drawn from the different 
intelligences. 
8. Susceptibility to encoding in a symbol system. 
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By looking for evidence of the conjunction of all these criteria, 
Gardner was able to arrive at a set of seven distinct intelligences. They 
are as follows: 
 
1. Linguistic. The traditional verbal ability. Gardner was at pains to 
stress that although important for success, people could manage 
without being adept at linguistic intelligence. Einstein, unlike 
Galton, could not recite poetry and slabs of Latin at the age of four; 
indeed it is said that he did not speak his first words until four, and it 
is certainly recorded in many places that he preferred to think in 
images. 
2. Spatial. Again, a traditional psychometric ability that refers to the 
ability to visualise spatial arrangements and to manipulate and 
transform them. 
3. Logical-mathematical. The type of intelligence is tapped by many 
conventional intelligence tests (e.g., IQ tests). Gardner described 
this intelligence as involving both a love of dealing with ideas and 
the power to follow very long chains of mathematical reasoning. It 
is not hard to see why this intelligence has been highly valued in 
Western societies. 
4. Musical. The power to understand the music of others, to reproduce 
it, and to compose one's own. Music has three essential elements: 
pitch, timbre, and rhythm. Those high in musical intelligence can 
integrate these well (Howard, 1991). Although many researchers 
dispute that music is a separate intelligence, there is no doubt that it 
does not correlate highly with traditional measures of intelligence, 
hence the need to create new measures to predict musical 
achievement (e.g., Fogarty, Buttsworth, & Gearing, 1996). 
5. Interpersonal. Involves understanding and "getting on with" other 
people. The term "social intelligence" is often used to describe this 
same intelligence. John Horn developed measures of social 
intelligence as an indicator of crystallised intelligence. Gardner, on 
the other hand, believes that it is an intelligence in its own right. 
6. Intrapersonal. This intelligence has to do with how well we 
understand ourselves, our motivations, moods, strengths and 
weaknesses. At first glance, this may seem a rather unimportant 
intelligence, but some interesting Australian work on self-
knowledge will be discussed later in the chapter.  
7. Bodily-kinesthetic. This pertains to body movements, sense of 
balance, hand-eye coordination, and so forth.  
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The critics of Gardner's theory point out that it is difficult to see how 
all these seven intelligences meet his eight criteria (e.g., Brody, 1992). 
They also point out that if subjectivity enters into the decision about 
what are intelligences and what are not, there may be a very large 
number of these indeed. The theories developed on the basis of factor 
analysis and related methods may be difficult for many to comprehend, 
but they were based on empirical data. Thus, the factors derived from 
the psychometric literature are well-established. Gardner's theory, on the 
other hand, appears to have both an empirical and a subjective basis. 
Gottfredson (1997) warned "Labelling other abilities and traits as other 
'intelligences' creates only the appearance, not the reality, of multiple 
equally useful abilities" (p. 6). Despite these reservations, the theory has 
generated a lot of interest and stimulated research in relatively neglected 
areas.  
 
Sternberg's triarchic theory 
 Robert Sternberg's (1985) triarchic theory proposed that there 
are three fundamental aspects of human intelligence - analytic, creative, 
and practical. Analytic intelligence is what is typically measured by 
intelligence tests. Problems testing this type of intelligence usually a) 
have a single correct answer, b) come with all the information needed to 
solve them, and c) have little intrinsic interest. Practical problems, in 
contrast, tend to a) require a definition of the problem, b) be poorly 
defined, c) have several solutions, d) require everyday experience, and 
e) require motivation and personal involvement. Sternberg was not the 
first to make a distinction between analytic and practical intelligence, 
Neisser (1976) had done so much earlier, but research supporting the 
distinction did not emerge until the 1980s and 1990s. Ceci and Liker 
(1986) in a study of expertise in betting on horse races, found that 
handicappers used quite complex interactive models with as many as 
seven variables. Despite the seemingly obvious reliance of this type of 
ability on mathematical skills, level of performance was not correlated 
with IQ scores. There are other examples of complex skills being 
displayed in the workplace by people who do not score well on IQ tests. 
One criticism of these examples, however, is that they involve highly 
learned skills. In separate writings, Sternberg has emphasised the 
importance of coping with novel (what he called "nonentrenched") 
situations as a hallmark of intelligence. Ackerman (1988) has shown 
that intelligence plays a smaller and smaller role as a task ceases to be 
novel and becomes more automatic. It is sometimes difficult to say 
whether people displaying high levels of skills in a workplace situation 
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are displaying practical intelligence or highly overlearned skills. 
Motivation is also a major consideration.  
Whilst there may be some question about the status of practical 
intelligence, there is no disputing the status of what Sternberg called 
"creative intelligence". The notion of creative ability has existed for a 
long time. Research has shown that creative people tend to a) be experts 
in their field, b) have the capacity to think differently about problems, 
and c) be motivated by intrinsic (e.g., satisfaction) rather than extrinsic 
(e.g., money) rewards. Anastasi and Urbina (1997) reported that 
correlations between tests of intelligence and creativity tend to be low, 
although an average or above average intelligence is necessary but not 
sufficient for creativity to emerge. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to 
measure creativity and Sternberg's recognition of creative intelligence in 
his model has not really taken us any closer to understanding its nature. 
 
Piaget's theory 
 Most people today are familiar with the theories of cognitive 
development put forward by Swiss psychologist, Jean Piaget. As stated 
earlier, Piaget was not interested in individual differences in intelligence 
but in the means by which all children learn to act in an intelligent 
manner. His theory was constructed primarily on the basis of 
observational data. The four stages of cognitive development described 
in this theory give an insight into what he considered intelligence to be.  
 
1. Sensori-motor. A stage lasting up to the age of two during which the 
child is capable of very limited cognitive operations, mostly sensory 
in nature.  
2. Pre-operational. Lasting from two to seven years during which the 
child starts to develop a sense of concepts such as number and 
weight, but still only in a limited way. Everything is taken very 
literally.  
3. Concrete operations. The child is no longer so dominated by the 
appearance of things and is capable of a range of operations but is 
still not capable of abstract thought. 
4. Formal operations. From 11 years onward the child is increasingly 
capable of abstract thought. Piaget mentions the grasp of concepts 
such as probability as an indication that people have reached this 
stage. Many statistics lecturers would claim that some students 
never reach the formal operational stage! 
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It is interesting to compare this sequence with those shown on the 
left and right hand sides of Figure 8.2, which depicts Horn's version of 
the theory of fluid and crystallised intelligence. The two versions of the 
development of intelligence are not dissimilar.  Both show a 
developmental sequence wherein humans begin by dealing with sensory 
data, move to a stage where they form associations, and then ultimately 
progress to abstract levels of thinking. However, it would be a mistake 
to think of Piaget's model purely in terms of this progression from 
sensory perception to abstract thought. His model is rather complex and 
incorporates an explanation of how we actually acquire information and 
develop knowledge structures. The driving force behind intellectual 
progression is the struggle to make sense of our experience. We do this 
by building schemas, mental models that represent our view of the 
world. Once a schema is formed it can be used to assimilate new 
information. If the information is incompatible with the schema, we 
may be forced to alter the schema itself and restore equilibrium through 
a process that Piaget labelled accommodation. This is how learning 
occurs. At the same time, children are acquiring an increasingly 
complex range of cognitive operations, to the point where as adults we 
are capable of thinking about thinking itself.  
Piaget's views changed the way people thought about intelligence, 
especially the intelligence of children, and had a big impact on 
curriculum design in many countries.  His account of intelligence 
certainly represented a different point of view to the one being espoused 
by the factor analysts, who were developing their theories on the basis 
of individual differences observed in performance on cognitive tests.  
 
Biological approaches to intelligence 
 In recent years, one of the fastest growth areas in psychology has 
been the search for biological foundations for psychological constructs. 
Stankov, Boyle, and Cattell (1995) provided a succinct summary of 
these developments in the field of intelligence. A brief review follows. 
 
1. Brain Size. There is no doubt that brain size is related to degree of 
intelligence across species, although not within species.  Absolute 
brain size is not important but the ratio of brain size relative to body 
size does give a good indication of the intelligence of the species.  A 
person living today has a brain almost four times as large as one of 
our human ancestors who lived more than three million years ago 
(Di Lalla & Patrick, 1994).  In the process of evolution, the cortex 
became more and more convoluted.  The human brain is three times 
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as large as that of a chimpanzee, yet has only 1.25 times as many 
neurons.  The distinguishing characteristic of the human brain is the 
very large number of interneuronal connections, many of which 
have formed over the past 3 million years. The cause of this 
extraordinary change in our brain structure is undoubtedly related to 
increased tool use, increased complexity of social systems as 
humans ceased to be hunter-gatherers and started living in larger and 
larger communities, and increased dependence on written and 
spoken language.  Individuals with more complex brain structures 
were more likely to survive and reproduce, passing on these 
physical characteristics to the next generation. Despite the obvious 
connection between brain size and intelligence across species, 
however, there is very little evidence suggesting that within-species 
variation can tell us much about intelligence, the correlations are too 
weak (Stankov et al., 1995). Even where the correlations are more 
robust (e.g., Willerman, Schultz, Rutledge, & Bigler, 1991), it is 
impossible to say what these correlations mean. 
2. Biochemistry and intelligence. There have been reports of 
successful attempts to increase intelligence by nutritional means. 
Stankov cites one study that showed an increase of about 4 IQ points 
in children as a consequence of an intervention that assured a 
normal daily intake of vitamins and minerals. However, there is no 
reliable evidence that children already enjoying a normal intake of 
the same substances will show an increase in IQ (to use this term as 
a synonym for measured intelligence). Temporary boosts can be 
obtained by the use of stimulants, such as caffeine, but these 
substances will not have long-term effects.  
3. Neural efficiency and intelligence. Brain imaging techniques now 
allow us to observe metabolic  processes in the brain during the 
performance of cognitive tasks. It is early days yet for this kind of 
research but the evidence so far suggests that higher intelligence is 
associated with faster and more efficient neural activity (Stankov et 
al., 1995; Sternberg & Kaufman, 1998). That is, intelligent people 
don't have "more brains", they have "more efficient" brains. Eysenck 
(1967) was the first modern theorist to push this view strongly. 
Progress is likely to be slow in this research area because recording 
techniques are still somewhat unsuited to measuring things like 
speed of neural transmission and the imaging technique itself is very 
expensive.  
4. Health, age, and intelligence. There is not much evidence of the 
effects of poor health on intelligence. Stankov and co-workers at the 
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University of Sydney have found that there is a definite decline in 
fluid intelligence abilities with aging but that "higher mental 
functions seem to be largely spared the effects of transitory physical 
illness" (Stankov et al., 1995, p.24). 
 
Modern trends in the study of intelligence 
 One modern trend has already been mentioned, the tendency to 
search for biological correlates of intelligence. Two other trends are 
worth mentioning. The first has to do with a general opening up of the 
field of intelligence. Over the years, many abilities have been suggested 
but, for the most part, research has focussed on what has often been 
called analytical intelligence. In recent years, the field has expanded and 
researchers are now looking at the relationship between intelligence and 
personality (e.g., Stenberg & Ruzgis, 1994; Stankov et al., 1995). 
Stankov et al. (1995) concluded that both normal and abnormal 
personality traits can influence cognitive abilities but that the 
mechanism and the extent of its influence is unclear. Ackerman and 
Heggestad (1997) have thrown the net wider to include intelligence, 
personality, and interests. They found evidence that the three traits work 
in tandem with ability level and personality dispositions determining the 
probabilty of success in a particular task domain, and interests 
determining the motivation to attempt a task. Further research of this 
type will help to elucidate how a broad range of constructs, such as 
values, combine with intelligence, personality, and interests to 
determine behaviour. 
 A second encouraging trend in intelligence research has seen the 
continuing cross-fertilisation between the fields of cognitive psychology 
and individual differences. Hunt (1978, 1980) started this trend when he 
began to search for the basic processes involved in verbal ability. 
Following Hunt, cognitive psychologists began to use some of their 
experimental tasks, developed to measure very specific processes, as a 
way of shedding light on the factors identified by those working within 
the psychometric tradition. This has led to research in the area of 
cognitive speed and the use of very basic speeded tasks to measure 
intelligence. Researchers in South Australia (Vickers, & Smith, 1986; 
Nettlebeck, 1997) have developed a task called inspection time that 
reliably correlates with measures of intelligence. The IT task involves 
the discrimination of a very briefly presented stimulus and is said to 
measure the effective speed of intake of stimulus information. Deary 
and Stough (1996) have claimed this research programme as a success 
story in the reductionist approach to human intelligence. On a much 
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broader level, but still inspired by cognitive theory, Stankov and 
Crawford (1997) have been working on the concept of self-confidence 
and studying its relationship with human abilities. They concluded that 
"There exists a separate self-confidence trait that is tapped by 
confidence ratings from diverse cognitive measures. This trait may be 
viewed either as an aspect of metacognition and therefore close to 
human abilities or as part of the interface between abilities and 
personality" (Stankov & Crawford, 1997, p. 11).  
 These research programmes are helping to clarify the nature of 
intelligence but the reality is that there are not a lot of people working 
within the psychometric tradition, either here in Australia or overseas. 
One reason for the relative lack of researchers is undoubtedly the 
complexity of the psychometric method for many aspiring students. 
Another reason is the controversy that has from time to time surrounded 
the area. This chapter will close with a brief consideration of these 
issues.  
 
 Issues and controversies in intelligence 
 Unfortunately, the field of intelligence is as well known for its 
controversies as for its contributions to understanding human behaviour. 
Some of the controversies have attracted widespread publicity. This 
section will touch on the main controversies and relate their origins to 
work discussed earlier in this chapter. 
 
Improvement in Intelligence  
 The issue of whether intelligence test scores can be improved 
over the span of an individual's life is a complex one. At a general level, 
intelligence is like everything else: use it or lose it, as the popular saying 
goes. Given the right circumstances, obviously some improvement is 
possible, but it depends on what type of intelligence one is talking 
about. Crystallised intelligence can certainly go on improving, until late 
in life it seems. Fluid intelligence, on the other hand, appears to suffer a 
decline before one has reached middle age. Life habits (e.g., drug abuse) 
can accelerate the decline.  
 One of the most interesting findings to emerge in relation to 
changes in intelligence occurs at the population, rather than the 
individual, level. It has been observed in a large number of Western 
cultures that intelligence test scores have been rising steadily since they 
were first measured on a large scale in the 1930s. The effect is very 
powerful - at least 15 IQ points per generation for tests of fluid 
intelligence (Flynn, 1987). Our children are scoring much better than we 
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did at the same age. Explanations are not easy to come by but 
suggestions include increased schooling, better nutrition, and a host of 
improved environmental factors. 
 
The role of the general factor 
 Perhaps the most contentious issue in the history of research on 
intelligence has been the role of the general factor. Spearman and 
Thompson debated whether it existed and researchers since then have 
debated the importance that should be attached to it. Hierarchical 
models of intelligence showed that there was no necessary 
incompatibility between theories that stressed the general factor and 
theories that stressed primary mental abilities; it just depended where 
you looked in the hierarchy. Nevertheless, the question of the relative 
importance of each has always generated fierce debate. The strongest 
proponent of the importance of 'g' in recent times has been Arthur 
Jensen (1979, 1980). One of the strongest critics has been John Horn. 
 One reason so much heated debate has surrounded this question 
is that some of the proponents of a single-factor theory of intelligence 
have been associated with research that claims to demonstrate race 
differences in intelligence. As Stankov put it: 
Although it is not necessarily the case that the single 'g' factor 
position calls for a value laden view of group differences in 
intelligence, it just so happens that those holding a multiple 
intelligence view (Gardner, 1983; see also Horn & Noll, 1994) 
appear to be more sensitive in their discussion of racial issues. 
(Stankov, 1998, p. 55).  
 Stankov also feared what he saw as a tendency to "mindless 
reductionism" among some of those who hold the single factor view. In 
particular, he stressed that emphasising a single factor ignores a large 
body of evidence pointing to the existence of many factors at different 
levels of complexity. Such a narrow view overlooks the richness of 
human cognition. 
The problem with attaching too much importance to speed, and 
hence to the brain, is that there is not a lot that we can do about brain 
structures. There is a danger that over-reliance on biological 
explanations of intelligence will encourage us to think of intelligence as 
something that is immutable. Furthermore, whilst speed and neural 
efficiency are undoubtedly important aspects of analytical intelligence, 
and worthy of continued research, it is doubtful that it will play such a 
leading role in other types of intelligence discussed in this chapter, such 
as those listed by Gardner. 
Intelligence: Theories And Issues   30 
Race differences in intelligence 
  Along with the issue of the importance of the general factor, 
questions of race differences in intelligence have always sparked a 
heated debate. Arthur Jensen and Hans Eysenck separately published 
extensive data showing that as a group black Americans scored about 
one standard deviation lower than white Americans on standard tests of 
intelligence (e.g., Jensen, 1985). That announcement in itself was 
unlikely to cause a great deal of controversy. Concern, yes, controversy, 
no. The controversial aspect of their work was the linking of this 
difference with genetic differences. If the difference has a genetic basis, 
some governments feel justified withdrawing funding support for 
programmes designed to improve learning opportunities for 
disadvantaged people. The 1994 publication by Hernstein and Murray 
of the extremely controversial book referred to as "The Bell Curve" saw 
an unprecedented level of discussion on this topic. The authors argued 
that unintelligent people are a drain on society and that society will 
eventually form itself into two classes: a privileged intelligent group and 
an increasingly underprivileged unintelligent group. Such sentiments are 
often expressed in society but Hernstein and Murray backed their claims 
with a detailed statistical analysis of research on group differences on 
IQ scores.  
 To understand the heat generated by this sort of discussion, it is 
helpful to return to the points made at the outset of the chapter about the 
importance of intelligence in our society and the consequences of 
scientists claiming that intelligence is genetically based. Not many 
scientists would deny that intelligence is partly determined by genetics 
but most would also acknowledge that learning experiences play a very 
important role. Unfortunately, although we have learned much about 
intelligence, we have not yet found a way to handle the controversies 
that are a byproduct of research in this area. As Rowe (1997) 
commented, whilst research on intelligence as a property of the mind 
(information processing, mental self-management) and the brain (speed 
of neural transmission, brain size, rate of brain metabolism) constitutes 
perhaps the most active frontier today in the study of intelligence, there 
has been no comparable sociology of intelligence to explain how the 
effects of this research reverberate through the social system. 
 The publication of Hernstein and Murray's book created such an 
uproar that the American Psychological Association set up a special 
Task Force under the leadership of Ulrich Neisser to report on factual 
issues relevant to the debate (Neisser et al., 1996). Some of the findings 
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of the Task Force are summarised below and provide a fitting closing 
comment on many of the themes raised in this chapter. 
 
1. The Task Force concluded that the genetic effects on measured 
intelligence are substantial but that the pathway by which genes 
produce their effects is still unknown.   
2. The environment also exerts a substantial effect on the development 
of intelligence but, once again, we do not clearly understand what 
those environmental factors are or how they work. 
3. The role of nutrition in intelligence is equally unclear. Although it is 
known that severe childhood malnutrition restricts cognitive 
development, there is no convincing evidence that dietary 
supplements in normal populations has any positive effect on 
intelligence. 
4. Information-processing speed and psychometric intelligence are 
related, but we do not yet know how important speed should be to 
our understanding of the construct of intelligence. 
5. There are differences between Blacks and Whites on tests of 
intelligence which do not appear to be due to any obvious biases in 
test construction and administration, nor to differences in 
socioeconomic status. At present, we do not know why these 
differences exist.  
6. The Task Force also mentioned the range of other abilities not 
currently sampled by existing tests of intelligence. These abilities 
include creativity, wisdom, practical sense, social sensitivity, and 
perhaps others that we do not yet know about. Whilst this situation 
persists, our understanding of the construct of intelligence is 
limited. 
 
If these conclusions seem a little weak - a series of confessions 
about what we do not know - surely that is appropriate. Despite the 
progress in our understanding of intelligence, we still have a long way 
to go. The Task Force summarised the situation very concisely in its 
concluding comment: 
 
In a field where so many issues are unresolved and so many 
questions unanswered, the confident tone that has characterised 
most of the debate on these topics is clearly out of place. The study 
of intelligence does not need politicised assertions and 
recriminations; it needs self-restraint, reflection, and a great deal 
more research.  The questions that remain are socially as well as 
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scientifically important.  There is no reason to think them 
unanswerable, but finding the answers will require a shared and 
sustained effort as well as the commitment of substantial scientific 
resources. Just such a commitment is what we strongly recommend. 
(Neisser et al., 1996, p. 97) 
 




1. Think about your own definition of intelligence. Write it down and 
be prepared to defend it to others. 
2. What is your view of the relative importance of a general factor of 
intelligence? Is it more useful to think of a single factor of 
intelligence that can explain much of our behaviour? Or to think of 
the many different factors of intelligence? 
3. Are there intelligences not mentioned in this chapter (e.g., emotional 
intelligence) that should be included in Gardner's list? What other 
ones can you think of? 
4. Do you think that the term "intelligence" is too culturally bound to 
be useful outside Western Society? 
5. Can you think of examples of behaviour in other cultures that would 
be considered intelligent but not so in our society? 
6. Is intelligence a uniquely human quality? Or confined to certain 
species? Or does it form a continuum throughout the animal 
kingdom? 
7. If intelligence is defined as "adaptation to one's environment", are 
all species equally intelligent? 
8. What reasons can you suggest for the large increase in IQ scores 
from generation to generation? 
 
At the time of writing this chapter, there is a site on the Web that will 
allow you to complete a short (5 min) intelligence test. There is no 
guarantee that it will still be around when you read this chapter, but here 
it is: "http://www.brain.com". 
 
Review Questions (Answer true or false to the following statements) 
 
1. Experts are the only people who are able to agree what intelligence 
means? 
2. The term 'g' was coined by Francis Galton? 
Intelligence: Theories And Issues   33 
3. Spearman and Thompson differed regarding the importance they 
attached to the general factor.  
4. Thurstone proposed that there were seven primary mental abilities. 
5. Thurstone proposed the first hierarchical model of intelligence. 
6. Cattell claimed that fluid intelligence (Gf) was biologically linked? 
7. Hebb's Intelligence B represented our innate potential. 
8. The Gf/Gc model is a hierarchical model of intelligence. 
9. Two tests that are correlated are said to rely upon at least one 
common ability. 
10. Factor analysis is a technique that forms the basis of all theories of 
intelligence. 
11. Positive manifold is a term that refers to the tendency for all 
cognitive tasks to be positively correlated. 
12. General crystallised intelligence declines with age whereas general 
fluid intelligence stays the same or may even increase. 
13. Guttman's radex model classifies tests in terms of complexity and 
content. 
14. Gardner subscribed to the view that there is a general factor of 
intelligence. 
15. One of the three basic intelligences represented in Sternberg's 
triarchic theory was called "emotional intelligence".  
16. Piaget did not use correlational methods but was very interested in 
individual differences in intelligence. 
17. Piaget's stage of formal operations marks the point at which a child 
reaches the level of abstract thought. 
18. It is not possible to judge intelligence within species by measuring 
brain size. 
19. Research has shown that dietary supplements will boost intelligence 
for most people.  
20. Differences noted between races on measured intelligence can be 
attributed to genetic influences. 
21. Our children are smarter than we are. 
 
 
Answers to Review Questions 
 
1. False. Whenever experts in the field have been assembled to address 
this question of definition (e.g., 1921, 1986), there have usually 
been as many definitions as experts. 
2. False. Charles Spearman invented the term to refer to whatever it 
was that all tests had in common. It was a mathematical abstraction 
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to which he gave some meaning by referring to it as a central energy 
source. 
3. False, they differed regarding their explanations for positive 
manifold, that is, the tendency for all cognitive tests to be positively 
correlated. Spearman thought that it was because all tests tapped a 
central energy source, Thompson felt that it was due to overlap in 
the bonds used for different tasks. 
4. True, they were S (Space), P (Perceptual Speed), N (Number 
Facility), V (Verbal Relations), W (Word Fluency), M (Memory), 
and I (Induction - i.e., reasoning). 
5. False, Thurstone's model involved uncorrelated factors, so there was 
no basis for any hierarchy. 
6. True, although Horn later argued that both Gf and Gc were 
biologically linked. 
7. False, Intelligence A represents this aspect of intelligence in Hebb's 
model. Intelligence B represents developed intelligence. 
8. True, although it might not look like the classical inverted-tree 
structure typically seen in hierarchical arrangements. It is a 
hierarchical model because it has higher-order factors. 
9. True, in psychometrics the existence of a correlation between two 
tests is usually interpreted as meaning that performance on both tests 
is driven by at least one common underlying factor. 
10. False, it is a technique used by many theorists but Gardner, Piaget, 
and a number of others did not use it. 
11. True. The observation of this phenomenon led Spearman to propose 
his single factor theory of general intelligence. 
12. False, it is the other way around, Gf declines from about age 27 
onwards. 
13. True, tests towards the centre of his radex are complex, those 
towards the outer edge are less complex. Tests are arranged around 
the circumplex in terms of content. 
14. False, it was Gardner's firm view that there are multiple independent 
intelligences. 
15. False, the three intelligences listed in Sternberg's triarchic theory are 
analytic, creative, and practical.  
16. False, he used mostly observational methods and was not interested 
in individual differences but in how children learned to think  
17. True, abstract thought is the most complex of the operations that we 
master in the course of intellectual development. 
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18. True. Such comparisons are possible across species but there is little 
scientific evidence that brain size in humans is related to 
intelligence. 
19. False. Studies show that only in situations where people are lacking 
certain vitamins in their diets, will daily supplements containing the 
missing vitamins lead to increases in intelligence. Such situations 
are not likely to occur for most people in developed societies. 
20. False. Genetic influences play a part, but environment is also a very 
powerful determinant of intelligence.  
21. True (or false, depending on how well you have argued your case). 
It is true that as a group, our children are scoring much higher on 
tests of intelligence than we did, especially tests requiring fluid 
abilities. Whether that means they are smarter is a difficult question 
to answer. In Hebb's terms, they certainly have a higher Intelligence 
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